American University Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 5

Article 1

2020

One of These Things Is Not Like The Other: NAACP v. Alabama is
Not a Manual for Powerful, Wealthy Spenders to Pour Unlimited
Secret Money into Our Political Process
Erin Chlopak
Campaign Legal Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Election Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chlopak, Erin (2020) "One of These Things Is Not Like The Other: NAACP v. Alabama is Not a Manual for
Powerful, Wealthy Spenders to Pour Unlimited Secret Money into Our Political Process," American
University Law Review: Vol. 69 : Iss. 5 , Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol69/iss5/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

One of These Things Is Not Like The Other: NAACP v. Alabama is Not a Manual
for Powerful, Wealthy Spenders to Pour Unlimited Secret Money into Our Political
Process

This article is available in American University Law Review: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol69/
iss5/1

ARTICLES
ONE OF THESE THINGS IS NOT LIKE THE
OTHER: NAACP V. ALABAMA IS NOT A
MANUAL FOR POWERFUL, WEALTHY
SPENDERS TO POUR UNLIMITED SECRET
MONEY INTO OUR POLITICAL PROCESS
ERIN CHLOPAK*
In Citizens United, eight of the Supreme Court’s nine Justices reaffirmed the
Court’s earlier decisions holding that election-related transparency laws are
constitutional. Those eight Justices agreed that voters have a right to know who is
paying for pre-election ads that mention candidates—“[e]ven if the ads only pertain
to a commercial transaction.” And they recognized that election spending
“transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper
weight to different speakers and messages.”
In the near decade since Citizens United was decided, lower courts have invoked
the decision to uphold a wide range of federal and state disclosure laws, rejecting
arguments urging a narrow interpretation of the decision. And the Supreme Court
has declined subsequent requests to revisit its disclosure holding. In fact, the Court’s
determination that disclosure requirements are constitutional was critical to the
other part of Citizens United, in which a five-Justice majority invalidated the ban
on independent, corporate-funded election expenditures. The Court held that
disclosure is a “less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of
speech” and predicted the decision would usher in a new “campaign finance
system that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure.”

* Director of Campaign Finance Strategy, Campaign Legal Center. I am deeply
grateful to Aseem Mulji and Maggie Christ for their invaluable contributions to this
Article and to Solomon Miller for his helpful work on the early stages of this piece.
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Decisions from Buckley (1976) to Citizens United (2010) have continued
to recognize a singular, limited as-applied disclosure exemption for groups
facing a “reasonable probability” of threats, harassment, or reprisals.
Historically, that exemption has been reserved for vulnerable groups like the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in
1950s Alabama—organizations whose members faced violent retribution if their
names were disclosed.
As attempts to invalidate or limit election-related disclosure laws have failed, wellfunded dark money organizations are now seeking a back-door approach—claiming
the narrow NAACP exemption for their own anti-transparency objectives. These new
efforts generally ignore the factual context for which the NAACP exemption was
recognized. They also dismiss the Supreme Court’s recognition that election-related
disclosure rules promote the First Amendment rights of American voters to be
informed about who is trying to influence their electoral decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
1

In Citizens United v. FEC, eight of the Supreme Court’s nine Justices
reaffirmed decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that
election-related transparency laws are constitutional. Those eight
Justices recognized that disclosure of election expenditures “enables
the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages,” while also providing citizens with
important information necessary to hold elected officials accountable.2
The Justices agreed that voters have a right to know who is paying for
pre-election ads that mention candidates, even if the ads do not
explicitly advocate for or against the candidate’s election.3
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion predicted that the Court’s
disclosure holding, combined with the more controversial part of
Citizens United, in which a five-Justice majority invalidated the ban on
independent corporate- and union-funded election expenditures,
would usher in a new “campaign finance system that pairs corporate
independent expenditures with effective disclosure.”4 That prediction
could not have been more off-base. While corporate election spending
has surely been on the rise, existing laws do not come close to ensuring
“effective disclosure,” and ongoing efforts seek to make the election
transparency regime even less effective.

1.
2.
3.
4.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 369–71.
Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 369–70.
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In particular, anti-transparency advocates and others who prefer to
influence our politics in secret are pursing litigation, policy, and public
advocacy campaigns to create a mechanism to influence the political
process in secret, elevating political spenders’ preference for anonymity
over the well-established right of citizens to make informed decisions at
the ballot box. These efforts seek a dramatic expansion of a narrow, asapplied disclosure exemption generally reserved for vulnerable groups
like the NAACP in Jim Crow Alabama or the Socialist Workers Party
during the early 1980s—organizations that lacked substantial political and
economic power and whose members faced violent retribution if their
names were disclosed. Recent efforts to invoke that exemption as a basis
for avoiding or negating disclosure rules generally ignore the factual
context for which the exemption was originally recognized. Antitransparency advocates also dismiss the Supreme Court’s recognition that
election-related disclosure rules are uniquely important because they
promote American voters’ First Amendment right to be informed about
who is trying to influence their electoral decisions.5
This Article surveys the variety of strategies that powerful, antitransparency advocates are employing to undermine electionspending transparency laws and co-opt the disclosure exemption for
marginalized groups facing serious threats and harassment. First, it
traces the history of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance disclosure
decisions, which have uniformly upheld transparency requirements for
spending on election-related advocacy. Second, it describes the origins
of the disclosure exemption for vulnerable groups like the NAACP in
the 1950s—groups whose members faced serious threats, harassment,
or retaliation if identified and for whom disclosure thus compromised
the exercise of First Amendment associational rights. It also explains
how the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied this “NAACP
exemption” in the context of election transparency laws. Third, it
surveys recent efforts to diminish election spending transparency by
distorting the NAACP exemption through litigation, policy reforms,
and in public discourse. Finally, it explains how the current legal
landscape already enables extensive evasion of existing campaign
finance disclosure laws and it is thus more important now than ever to
prevent efforts to misappropriate the NAACP exemption and
transform it into a loophole that undermines citizens’ rights to make
informed electoral choices.
5. Id. at 366–69, 371.
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I. TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS ADVANCE FIRST AMENDMENT
INTERESTS AND ARE A CRUCIAL TOOL FOR PREVENTING SECRET
ELECTION SPENDING FROM UNDERMINING OUR DEMOCRACY
Informing citizens about the sources of money spent to influence
elections is foundational to the American system of self-government.6 As
the Supreme Court explained in Citizens United, “[t]he right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to
protect it.”7 Citizens cannot fully and effectively participate in the political
process unless they have access to information about who supports which
positions and why. Access to that information is also necessary to hold
elected officials accountable, and to ensure officeholders remain
responsive to the public. These principles underlie the Supreme Court’s
campaign finance disclosure decisions, which collectively embrace
transparency about election-related spending as a constitutionally
permissible and effective means of protecting citizens’ First Amendment
rights to make “informed choices in the political marketplace.”8
A. The Supreme Court Has Long Recognized the Democratic Value of
Election-Spending Transparency
The first federal campaign finance disclosure law was passed in 19109 and
expanded in 1925.10 The law was weak and widely circumvented, though it
survived a lawsuit claiming that it infringed the power of the states.11
Congress, the Supreme Court held, may “pass appropriate legislation to

6. Cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (noting that free
discussion of ideas and speech is crucial to self-government).
7. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
8. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003), partially abrogated by Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363–65 (2010) (striking down the federal ban on
corporate-funded independent expenditures and electioneering communications,
which had been upheld in McConnell). Although Citizens United abrogated one part of
the Court’s earlier decision in McConnell, most important for purposes of this article
was the Citizens United Court’s reaffirmance, by an eight-Justice majority, of the
constitutionality of the federal transparency requirements for such spending. Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 366–71.
9. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-274, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (repealed 1971).
10. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, §§ 301–319, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
11. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (declaring it within
Congress’s power to pass legislation designed to protect presidential elections from
corruption and requiring the public disclosure of political contributions to further
that goal); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 62 (1976) (per curiam).
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safeguard [a Presidential] election from the improper use of money to
influence the result.”12
Most of the statutory framework governing money in politics today
was enacted as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), and its amendments in 1974.13 FECA’s early provisions broadly
regulated “all money spent ‘in connection with’ or ‘for the purpose of
influencing’ federal elections.”14 The statute included limitations on
political contributions to federal candidates, public disclosure of
contributions above a threshold, public funding for Presidential
candidates, and the creation of a Federal Election Commission (FEC)
to enforce the laws.15
When FECA was challenged in court, it resulted in a 1976 Supreme
Court decision that continues to govern the constitutional parameters
for how courts analyze a range of campaign finance requirements. In
Buckley v. Valeo,16 the Supreme Court generally upheld federal
transparency rules for political contributions and expenditures, while
striking down monetary limits on those expenditures.17
The Court acknowledged the First Amendment implications of
FECA’s original disclosure requirements,18 but explained that unlike

12. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545.
13. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(amended 1974).
14. Trevor Potter & Kirk L. Jowers, The Frequently Mischaracterized Impact of the Courts
on the FEC and Campaign Finance Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 840 (2002).
15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7 (summarizing FECA’s early provisions).
16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
17. Id. at 23, 29, 35, 39, 51.
18. FECA originally imposed expenditure limits and reporting requirements on
independent expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 39
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)). In reviewing the
constitutionality of those provisions in Buckley, the Court adopted a narrowing
construction of “expenditure” to avoid vagueness and overbreadth problems. Id. at 40–
44, 80. Under Buckley, federal disclosure requirements for independent expenditures
applied only to “expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” Id. at 44. Decades
later, the Court clarified that its so-called “express advocacy” limitation was a “product
of statutory interpretation”—to avoid constitutional problems of vagueness and
overbreadth—“rather than a constitutional command.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93, 192 (2003), partially abrogated by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). That
clarification was key to the Court’s subsequent decisions upholding legislation that
extended disclosure requirements to a broader range of communications, including
commercial ads that merely mention a candidate and are broadcast shortly before an
election. See infra Sections I.B.–C.
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limits on contributions and expenditures, disclosure requirements
“impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities.”19 Disclosure laws
are thus constitutionally permissible when there is a “substantial
relation” between the information required to be disclosed and a
“sufficiently important” government interest.20 This intermediate
standard of constitutional scrutiny—which is less demanding than the
“strict scrutiny” standard that applies to political expenditure
restrictions—is often called “exacting scrutiny.”21 The Buckley Court
identified three “sufficiently important” government interests that
election-related disclosure laws advance: (1) allowing voters to better
evaluate candidates for federal office; (2) deterring corruption and the
appearance of corruption; and (3) detecting other campaign finance
violations, such as circumvention of FECA’s contribution limits or its
ban on foreign interference in American elections.22
In Buckley, the Court held that FECA’s disclosure requirements were
substantially related to these important government interests and thus
outweighed concerns about potentially infringing the exercise of First
Amendment rights, “particularly when the ‘free functioning of our
national institutions’ is involved.”23
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the
constitutional permissibility—and democratic value—of requiring
transparency in the context of electoral advocacy. Just two years after
Buckley, the Court upheld transparency requirements in the context of
ballot initiative elections and recognized that identifying who is behind
advertising for ballot measures enables “the people . . . to evaluate the
arguments to which they are being subjected.”24

19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
20. Id. at 64–66.
21. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (“We have a series of precedents
considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements in the electoral
context. These precedents have reviewed such challenges under what has been termed
‘exacting scrutiny[,]’” which “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure
requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest”).
22. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68.
23. Id. at 66 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 97 (1961)).
24. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978).
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B. The Court in McConnell Recognized that Secret Election Spending
Harms Citizens’ First Amendment Rights
A couple decades after Buckley, the Court revisited the
constitutionality of political reporting and disclaimer requirements in
the context of a challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA).25 BCRA, popularly known as the McCain-Feingold Act,
was, in part, Congress’s response to the growing problem of
independent groups who run election-related advertisements “while
hiding behind dubious and misleading names.”26 The Act extended FEC
reporting requirements and “disclaimer” rules—disclaimers must
provide information on the face of an ad about who paid for it and
whether it is authorized by a candidate27—for pre-election ads that
mention a candidate and are broadcast in the jurisdiction where that
candidate is running for office.28 BCRA’s transparency provisions
required organizations to reveal the sources of money used to pay for
these “electioneering communication[s]”29 so that the public could
properly evaluate the election ads flooding the airways.
Senator Mitch McConnell and other plaintiffs claimed those
requirements violated their First Amendment rights, but in McConnell
v. FEC, eight Justices firmly disagreed.30 As the Court recounted, the
record in the case reflected that corporations and labor unions had
been funding broadcast advertisements “designed to influence federal
elections . . . while concealing their identities from the public.”31
Advertisements ran under misleading names like: “‘The CoalitionAmericans Working for Real Change’ (funded by business organizations
opposed to organized labor), ‘Citizens for Better Medicare’ (funded by
the pharmaceutical industry), ‘Republicans for Clean Air’ (funded by
brothers Charles and Sam Wyly).”32
“Given these tactics,” the Court questioned “how ‘uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open’ speech can occur when organizations hide themselves

25. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–30101 (2012)).
26. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003).
27. 52 U.S.C. § 30120(a), (c)–(d) (2012); 11 C.F.R. § 110.11 (2006).
28. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(f), 30120.
29. Id. § 30104(f).
30. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 120–21.
31. Id. at 196 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003)
(three-judge court)).
32. Id. at 197 (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 237).
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from the scrutiny of the voting public.”33 BCRA’s transparency
requirements are not only constitutionally permissible, the Court held, they
affirmatively promote the “First Amendment interests of individual citizens
seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace.”34
C. Citizens United Confirms the First Amendment Value of ElectionSpending Transparency Laws
In 2010, the Supreme Court once again revisited the question of
whether, and to what extent, election-spending transparency
requirements are permissible under the First Amendment.35 To be
sure, Citizens United is best known for the part of the opinion in which
five Justices held that corporations and unions have a First
Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts of their general
treasury funds to influence elections.36 But Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion explicitly linked that controversial holding to another part of
the opinion in which eight Justices reaffirmed the Court’s holding in
McConnell that requiring transparency of the sources of paid political
speech promotes First Amendment interests.37
Citizens United is a § 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation that wanted
to pay a cable company to distribute through video on demand a film
about then Secretary of State and presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton.38 It also wanted to run on television a series of short
advertisements promoting its film.39 In claiming that BCRA’s reporting
and on-ad disclaimer requirements violated the organization’s First
Amendment rights, Citizens United urged the Supreme Court to
broadly hold that BCRA’s disclosure requirements must be confined
to ads that expressly advocate for or against candidates.40 The group
also suggested that its short promotional advertisements—some of
which were just ten seconds long—should be exempt from disclosure

33. Id. (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 237).
34. Id. (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 237).
35. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
36. Id. at 363–65.
37. Id. at 366–71.
38. See Video on Demand (VoD), TECHOPEDIA (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.
techopedia.com/definition/25650/video-on-demand-vod [https://perma.c c/V 3P6L9UP] (defining Video on Demand as “a system that allows users to select and watch
video content of their choice on their TVs or computers”).
39. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320.
40. Id. at 368–69.
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requirements because they “only attempt[ed] to persuade viewers to
see [its] film,” and should not be construed as electioneering.41
The Court rejected both arguments and reaffirmed its holding in
McConnell that transparency laws advance First Amendment interests,
including when applied to Citizens United’s short movie ads.42 The Court
explained that prompt disclosure of election spending provides citizens
with information necessary to hold elected officials “accountable for their
positions and supporters” and to “see whether elected officials are ‘in the
pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.”43 The Court explained that the
public’s “informational interest alone is sufficient to justify” application of
BCRA’s transparency requirements “[e]ven if the ads only pertain to a
commercial transaction” because transparency accords the electorate the
opportunity to give proper weight to different speakers and messages.44
In the decade since it was decided, lower courts have applied Citizens United
to uphold a wide range of state and federal political transparency laws.45

41. Id. at 369.
42. Id. at 368–70.
43. Id. at 369.
44. Id. at 369.
45. See, e.g., Indep. Inst. v. Williams, 812 F.3d 787, 799 (10th Cir. 2016); Del. Strong
Families v. Attorney Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2015); Justice v.
Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285, 301 (5th Cir. 2014); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,
758 F.3d 118, 145 (2d Cir. 2014); Free Speech v. FEC, 720 F.3d 788, 798 (10th Cir.
2013); Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1255 (11th Cir. 2013); Real Truth
About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544, 558 (4th Cir. 2012); Ctr. for Individual
Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 499 (7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v.
McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 72 (1st Cir. 2011); Human Life of Wash. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d
990, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010); SpeechNOW.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(en banc). But see Ams. for Prosperity v. Grewal, No. 3:19-cv-14228-BRM-LHG, 2019
WL 4855853, at *20 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2019) (preliminarily enjoining New Jersey’s broad
donor disclosure requirements for groups that spend money to influence elections or
to simply provide political information on election issues); Citizens Union of N.Y. v.
Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 408 F. Supp. 3d 478, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (invalidating New
York’s broad ethics reform legislation, which imposed public donor disclosure
requirements on non-profit charities that donated to social welfare non-profits).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS RECOGNIZED A LIMITED, AS-APPLIED
DISCLOSURE EXEMPTION FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS THAT REASONABLY
FEAR SERIOUS THREATS AND HARASSMENT
In Buckley, McConnell, and Citizens United, the Supreme Court
concluded that the government’s interest in ensuring citizens are able
to make informed electoral choices outweighed concerns about the
alleged burdens that disclosure requirements would impose on the
plaintiffs’ political advocacy. While upholding the transparency
requirements challenged in those cases, each opinion recognized that
a future as-applied challenge to a disclosure law remains available to a
group that “could show a ‘reasonable probability’ that disclosure of its
contributors’ names ‘will subject them to threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.’”46
That standard originated in a pair of earlier cases involving
constitutional challenges to laws in 1950s Alabama and Arkansas at a time
of deep political unrest and violence. These challenges arose in the early
days of the modern Civil Rights Movement against laws that required the
NAACP to provide government officials with lists of NAACP members.47
As described below, those cases were decided on a thorough record
cataloguing serious threats, violence, and other harassment.48
A. Origin of the “NAACP Exemption”
In 1956, the Alabama Secretary of State required the NAACP to disclose
the names and addresses of all of its members in the state, pursuant to
Alabama’s regulation of foreign corporations.49 Fearing for the safety of its
members, the NAACP refused and was held in contempt by Alabama state
courts.50 The organization petitioned for review in the United States

46. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 367 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 544 U.S. 93, 198
(2003)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
47. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451, 462–63 (1958)
(concluding that an Alabama mandate compelling the NAACP to disclose the
identities of its members would likely entail “a substantial restraint upon the exercise
by [NAACP] members of their right to freedom of association” in light of the
organization’s uncontroverted showing of economic reprisals, loss of employment,
and threats of violence against NAACP members).
48. See infra Section II.A.
49. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 452–53 (outlining the allegations in the suit the
Attorney General brought to force the NAACP to disclose its members’ information).
50. Id. at 451.
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Supreme Court, asserting that Alabama’s disclosure requirement violated
its members’ First Amendment rights of free association.51
The Supreme Court agreed with the NAACP: black civil rights
activists in the southern states faced such severe threats that a
requirement to publicly identify their names and addresses would
likely deter them from remaining or becoming members of the
organization.52 The record included threats directed at schools where
African-American students were attempting to enroll; bombings and
shootings directed against buses, homes of African-American leaders
and ministers, black taxi stands, and black churches; and Ku Klux Klan
demonstrations and cross burnings.53
The Court concluded that Alabama’s disclosure mandate, in light of
the record presented by the NAACP, posed “the likelihood of a
substantial restraint upon the exercise by [its] members of their right
to freedom of association” by inducing some members to withdraw
from the organization and dissuading others from joining because of

51. See id. at 451, 453–54 (setting forth the NAACP’s constitutional arguments in
defense of nondisclosure).
52. Id. at 462–63; see also Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the
Disclosure Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 409–11 (2012) (describing the
factual context in which the NAACP v. Alabama case arose).
53. Although the Supreme Court’s opinion omits the details, the brief for the
NAACP cites numerous specific examples, including the following:
• a year-long series of bombings and shootings of African-American leaders in the
bus segregation issue;
• nine bombings and ten shootings directed against buses or the homes of
African-American leaders;
• the bombing of the home of Rev. F.L. Shuttlesworth, an African-American
leader of the bus boycott;
• the bombing of four Black churches, homes of two ministers who were both
leaders in the bus boycott, and a Black taxi stand, as well as the attempted
bombing of the home of Rev. M.L. King; and
• false bombing reports at Phillips High School and student demonstrations at
Woodland High School following reports that African-American students
would attempt to enroll at these schools.
Brief for Petitioner, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (No. 91),
1957 WL 55387, at *16 n.12. Dale Ho, former Assistant Counsel of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund and current Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU)
Voting Rights Project, observed that, “[a]lthough the Court did not discuss the larger
social context in its decision, it seems implausible that the violent reprisals that faced
civil rights activists at the time were not in the minds of the Justices when this case was
decided.” Ho, supra note 52, at 414–15.
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fear of the consequences of being publicly associated with it.54 It
further found that Alabama’s purpose—“to determine whether [the
NAACP] was conducting intrastate business in violation of the Alabama
foreign corporation registration statute”—was not “sufficient to overcome
[the NAACP’s] constitutional objections.”55
The Supreme Court considered a similar case two years later. In Bates v.
City of Little Rock,56 the cities of Little Rock and North Little Rock, Arkansas
mandated disclosure of the local NAACP’s membership list as part of their
new tax laws.57 The NAACP again refused and challenged the requirements
in court, invoking evidence of harassment, threats of violence, and economic
reprisals against NAACP members, and arguing that public disclosure of
membership would interfere with the freedom of association of NAACP
members.58 As it had found with respect to Alabama’s requirements, the
Court concluded that “the threat of substantial government encroachment
upon important and traditional aspects of individual freedom [wa]s neither
speculative nor remote.”59 It also found “no relevant correlation” between the
municipalities’ taxing power and the ordinances requiring local NAACP
branches to disclose and publish their membership lists.60
In both cases, the Supreme Court engaged in a two-part analysis.
First, the Court found that disclosure of NAACP member information
would likely lead to the same kinds of actual and threatened violence
and serious harassment that had already been well documented.61
Second, the Court found that the government interests underlying the
Alabama and Little Rock disclosure requirements were insufficiently
important to overcome the harm that the requirements would likely cause
to the First Amendment associational rights of the NAACP and its
members.62 As described below, courts have rarely reached similar
conclusions in the electoral context, where transparency requirements
serve important government interests and where, for the most part, the
anticipated harm from disclosure is nowhere near as extensive or severe.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462–63.
Id. at 464–65.
361 U.S. 516 (1960).
Id. at 517.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Id. at 525.
See id. at 523–24; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958).
See Bates, 361 U.S. at 525–27; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 465–66.
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B. The NAACP Exemption in the Context of Electoral Transparency Laws
The Supreme Court first considered how the NAACP exemption
applies to election-related disclosure requirements in Buckley. The Court
acknowledged that “public disclosure of contributions to candidates and
political parties will deter some individuals who might otherwise
contribute” and “[i]n some instances, disclosure may even expose
contributors to harassment or retaliation,” but it observed that in the
distinct context of campaign finance transparency, “disclosure
requirements—certainly in most applications—appear to be the least
restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and
corruption that Congress found to exist.”63 The Court further
recognized that “there are governmental interests sufficiently
important to outweigh the possibility of infringement, particularly
when the ‘free functioning of national institutions’ is involved.’”64
Given the importance of an informed electorate, as well as the
anticorruption and law enforcement interests served by campaign
finance transparency requirements, the Court refused to grant a
blanket disclosure exemption for minor political parties.65 Instead, it
recognized the availability of as-applied relief where “the type of chill
and harassment identified in NAACP v. Alabama can be shown.”66 The
Court clarified that a party “need show only a reasonable probability
that compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’ names will subject
them to threats, harassment, or reprisals,” and explained that relevant
proof “may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present
harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of
harassment directed against the organization itself.”67
A few years later, the Court revisited the applicability of the NAACP
exemption in the electoral context when the Socialist Workers Party
(SWP) challenged the State of Ohio’s campaign finance disclosure
requirements. Ohio’s laws would have required SWP, as a political
party, to disclose the names and addresses of campaign contributors

63. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 66.
65. Id. at 74.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003) (“In Buckley, unlike NAACP, we
found no evidence that any party had been exposed to economic reprisals or physical
threats as a result of the compelled disclosures. We acknowledged that such a case might
arise in the future, however, and addressed the standard of proof that would then
apply.” (citation omitted)).
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and recipients of campaign disbursements.68 The record included
examples of “threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning of
SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members’ property, police
harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP
office.”69 In addition, the Court cited “evidence that in the 12-month
period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired
because of their party membership,”70 while private hostility made it
hard for members to find employment.71 The record also showed that
the FBI had been surveilling and disrupting SWP operations for years,
including during the commencement of the lawsuit.72
The Supreme Court invoked Buckley’s analysis of NAACP and
considered both the probability of harm to SWP members and the
importance of the state’s interest in disclosure. It found “substantial
evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and
harassment of SWP members and supporters.”73 It also found that as a
“small” political party with only about sixty members in Ohio and “little
success at the polls,”74 SWP was unlikely to play a major role in politics
or policy, rendering the state’s interest in disclosure relatively low.75
The Court thus concluded that the balance tipped in favor of
exempting SWP from Ohio’s disclosure requirements.76
After Brown, the SWP sought and obtained an extension of its
campaign finance reporting exemption through the Federal Election
Commission’s advisory opinion process. A series of five successive
advisory opinions effectively extended the reporting exemption that
SWP had obtained through the Brown litigation for more than 30 years,
through December 31, 2016.77 But when SWP sought a new advisory
68. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
69. Id. at 99.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 91.
74. Id. at 88.
75. Id. at 95.
76. Id. at 102.
77. FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2012-38 (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.fec.gov/files/l
egal/aos/2012-38/AO-2012-38.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RCB-JKQZ]; FEC, ADVISORY
OPINION 2009-01 (Mar. 20, 2009), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2009-01/AO2009-01-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AHA-Z834]; FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2003-02
(Apr. 4, 2003), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2003-02/2003-02.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YEC4-AB59]; FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 1996-46 (Mar. 11, 1997), https://
www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/1996-46/1996-46.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FJ4E-72LY];

1410

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1395

opinion further extending the exemption beyond 2016, FEC
Commissioners in a divided vote declined to approve the request.78
SWP’s exemption thus expired at the end of that year. Commissioners
who voted against extending SWP’s disclosure exemption noted the
party’s increased electoral and fundraising success, found that the
evidence submitted by SWP “demonstrates that harassment of the SWP’s
supporters has steadily decreased over the years since its disclosure
exemption was first granted,” and concluded that this recent evidence
“does not indicate a reasonable probability that serious harassment and
reprisals are likely to be inflicted on SWP supporters.”79 The FEC has not
issued any other advisory opinions exempting a group from federal
campaign finance transparency requirements.80
Nor has the Supreme Court, since Brown, found sufficient evidence
of probable threats or harassment to overcome the government’s
substantial interests in transparent elections.81 In McConnell, the Court
distinguished the record before the Court from the record in Brown,
agreeing with the district court that while some parties had expressed
harassment concerns, there was a “lack of specific evidence about the
basis for these concerns.”82 In Citizens United, the Court similarly
referenced “recent events in which donors to certain causes were
blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation.”83 The
Court expressed “concern” about these examples, but nevertheless
rejected Citizens United’s challenge to BCRA’s transparency
requirements, citing a lack of any evidence that Citizens United or its

FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 1990-13 (Aug. 21, 1990), https://www.fec.gov/f iles/legal/
aos/1990-13/1990-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW64-58WE].
78. FEC, ADVISORY OPINION REQUEST 2016-23 (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.fec.gov
/files/legal/aos/2016-23/2016-23.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV42-YU2T].
79. FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2016-23 (SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY) DRAFT B (Mar. 8,
2017), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2016-23/201623_1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/GEM3-WJBZ]; see FEC, VOTE CERTIFICATION (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/
files/legal/aos/2016-23/201623V_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6XB-VEQY] (reflecting
vote of two Commissioners in support of Draft B).
80. In one other instance, in 2013, the Commission, through another divided vote,
declined to grant a request by the Tea Party Leadership Fund. FEC, ADVISORY OPINION
REQUEST 2013-17 (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2013-17/AO2013-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK3E-YGQ8].
81. As described infra Section II.C, lower courts have followed the Supreme
Court’s guidance and construed the NAACP exemption narrowly.
82. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 199 (2003) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 247 (D.D.C. 2003) (three-judge court)).
83. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
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members were likely to face similar threats and observing, “[t]o the
contrary, Citizens United has been disclosing its donors for years and
has identified no instance of harassment or retaliation.”84
Six months after deciding Citizens United, the Supreme Court issued
another opinion reaffirming the constitutionality of transparency
requirements “in the electoral context.”85 In Doe v. Reed,86 the Court
considered a First Amendment challenge to a Washington State public
records law that required public disclosure of the names and addresses
of individuals who signed referendum petitions.87 The particular
referendum at issue concerned whether to extend certain benefits to
same-sex couples, but the Court approached the case more broadly and
focused “not [on] whether disclosure of this particular petition would
violate the First Amendment, but whether disclosure of referendum
petitions in general would do so.”88 In a frequently cited concurrence,
Justice Scalia noted the plaintiffs’ concerns that “disclosure of petition
signatures may lead to threats and intimidation,” and suggested that while
the State of Washington could keep petition signatures secret to avoid such
consequences, it was not constitutionally required to do so, “[a]nd it may
even be a bad idea.”89 He opined, “[t]here are laws against threats and
intimidation; and harsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our
people have traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance.
Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic
courage, without which democracy is doomed.”90 Justice Scalia was
concerned by the prospect of anonymous political campaigning and
exercises of direct democracy through ballot initiatives and
referendums “hidden from public scrutiny and protected from the
accountability of criticism.”91 “This,” Scalia said, “does not resemble the
Home of the Brave.”92

84. Id.
85. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010).
86. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
87. Id. at 191.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 219, 228 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 228.
91. Id.
92. Id. In expressing these concerns, Justice Scalia invoked the Court’s earlier
decision in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, from which he dissented. 514 U.S. 334,
371–85 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In McIntyre, the Court held that an Ohio
disclosure statute could not constitutionally be applied to an individual’s in-person
distribution of homemade handbills advocating her views regarding an imminent
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Reed, and the Supreme Court’s campaign finance disclosure
decisions that preceded it, make clear that an entity is not entitled to
the NAACP exemption in the context of electoral transparency laws
merely because of general claims of threats or harassment. These cases
reflect the Court’s recognition of the crucial role electoral
transparency laws play in our democracy and the high bar that a party
must meet when it is seeking to deprive voters of important
information that may affect their electoral choices.
C. Lower Court Decisions Underscore the Narrow Scope of the NAACP
Exemption in the Campaign Finance Context
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and construed
the NAACP exemption narrowly when it has been invoked to try to
avoid electoral transparency requirements. To be sure, not every claim
for the exemption has been rejected, but other successful claimants
have had similar public profiles to either the NAACP or Socialist
Workers Party. In a couple of cases in the early 1980s, lower courts
granted disclosure exemptions to the Communist Party and an Illinois
branch of the Socialist Workers Party.93 In one case decided while the
Brown litigation was pending, an Illinois district court exempted the
referendum on a proposed school tax levy. Id. at 337, 357. The decision emphasized
the in-person nature of Mrs. McIntyre’s distribution of her handbills and the
“personally crafted” nature of such election materials and distinguished these
circumstances from Buckley. Id. at 337, 353–56. McIntyre is an outlier, and the Supreme
Court has never relied on it as authority in subsequent decisions addressing campaign
finance disclosure requirements; lower court campaign finance decisions also
frequently distinguish it. See, e.g., Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1203 n.14 (9th Cir.
2015); Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013); Ctr. for
Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 482 (7th Cir. 2012).
Justice Scalia’s dissent in McIntyre emphasizes the limited scope of the NAACP
exemption. To the question “whether a ‘right to anonymity’ is such a prominent value
in our constitutional system that even protection of the electoral process cannot be
purchased at its expense,” he concluded “[t]he answer . . . is clear: no.” McIntyre, 514
U.S. at 379. While cases, such as Brown, Bates, and NAACP, held that the disclosure of
a person’s identity in “peculiar circumstances” would “unconstitutionally deter the
exercise of the First Amendment,” those cases did not establish a right to anonymity
or the right of all citizens to ignore the laws under challenge. Id.
93. FEC v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1982)
(exempting the Communist Party from federal campaign finance disclosure
requirements); 1980 Ill. Socialist Workers Campaign v. Ill. Bd. of Elections, 531 F.
Supp. 915, 921–22 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (exempting a local branch of SWP—the same
Socialist Party group that obtained a disclosure exemption in the Socialist Workers
case—from Illinois disclosure laws).
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local branch of the Socialist Workers Party after its Chicago office was
firebombed and burglarized and the group had been surveilled by the
Chicago Police Department.94 In the other case, the Second Circuit
exempted the Communist Party from federal campaign finance
disclosure requirements, finding that it met Buckley’s high bar because
it was a “disfavored minority part[y]” or “fringe organization[ ]” whose
very existence would be threatened by disclosure.95 Indeed, the Second
Circuit cited various state and federal laws, still on the books, that
subjected members of the Communist Party to civil and criminal
liability, and concluded that the fear of serious reprisals was sufficiently
grave to warrant the exemption.96
Although these decisions granted disclosure exemptions to
marginalized and targeted fringe political party organizations, lower
courts have generally refrained from extending the exemption to
other groups. In particular, lower courts have rejected claims by large,
well-funded groups who would prefer to keep their donors anonymous
or who claim that disclosure would expose them to protests and other
harassment that does not nearly approach the scope or severity
documented in cases like NAACP and Brown.
In ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen,97 for example, two political
committees supporting California’s Proposition 8—which proposed an
amendment to the California constitution defining marriage as only
between a man and a woman98—sought an exemption from the state’s
campaign finance transparency laws. The plaintiffs alleged harassment
against supporters of Proposition 8, including vandalism of political
signs, angry protests, unsolicited phone calls, death threats, and
various forms of economic reprisal.99
Applying Buckley, the Eastern District of California found that the
plaintiffs’ claims did not warrant an exemption from the state’s
disclosure requirements.100 The court invoked the Supreme Court’s
determination that “disclosure exemptions were primarily intended to

94. 1980 Ill. Socialist Workers Campaign, 531 F. Supp. at 921.
95. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d at 419–20.
96. Id. at 422–23.
97. 830 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom.
ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2014).
98. Id. at 916.
99. See id. at 917–22 (summarizing in detail plaintiffs’ evidence of threats,
harassment, and reprisals).
100. Id. at 952.
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combat harms suffered by small, persecuted groups.”101 It also found
that plaintiffs were far from a fringe organization, having convinced
over seven million voters to support Proposition 8 (52.3% of the vote),
raised almost $30 million, and organized a “massive movement” to
successfully “legislate a concept steeped in tradition and history.”102
The California district court also distinguished the plaintiffs’ evidence
of threats, harassment, and reprisals from the “proportionality and
magnitude” demonstrated in Brown and NAACP.103 Plaintiffs offered
relatively few instances of serious harassment as compared to the many
millions who supported their cause.104 The court found that the seriousness
of the risk to plaintiffs paled in comparison to the systemic private and
governmental reprisals faced by socialist and communist groups or the
NAACP.105 It explained that supporters of a “movement to recognize
marriage in California as existing only between a man and a woman” were
not similarly situated to the SWP or NAACP plaintiffs in Brown and NAACP;
“Proposition 8 supporters promoted a concept entirely devoid of
governmental hostility.”106 The court was thus, “at a loss to find any principled
analogy between two such greatly diverging sets of circumstances.”107
Another critical distinction in the ProtectMarriage.com litigation was
the fact that much of the plaintiffs’ evidence of “harassment” involved
boycotts and angry protests, displays of dissatisfaction with plaintiffs’
cause that were themselves “forms of speech protected by [the First
Amendment].”108 As the court explained at an earlier stage of the
litigation, a decision not to patronize a particular establishment or
business, or to withhold economic resources is “an inherent right of
the American people” and “individuals have repeatedly resorted to
boycotts as a form of civil protest intended to convey a powerful
message.”109 This form of counter speech remains protected, the
Supreme Court has explained, even where “it may embarrass others or
101. Id. at 931.
102. Id. at 929.
103. Id. at 932–33.
104. Id. at 933 (“Plaintiffs . . . would need evidence of thousands of acts of reprisals, threats
or harassment, spanning much more than the short period of time covering California’s
ballot-initiative process to prove contributors to such a massive group are entitled to
anonymity of the type justified years ago for the individuals in Brown and NAACP.”).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 931–32.
107. Id. at 932.
108. Id. at 934.
109. Id.
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coerce them into action.”110 Ultimately, the California district court
concluded that Proposition 8 advocacy organizations did not qualify
for a disclosure exemption.111
A federal district court in Washington reached the same conclusion
in an analogous context in Doe v. Reed. As described in Section II.B, at
an earlier stage in the Reed litigation, the Supreme Court issued a broad
holding that requiring disclosure of individuals who sign referendum
petitions in general is permissible under the First Amendment.112
When the district court subsequently reached the merits of whether
mandatory disclosure of signatories to a state referendum to deny
benefits to same-sex couples violated the First Amendment, the court
found that Washington’s public records law was constitutional.113
As in ProtectMarriage.com, the Washington district court first
determined that the plaintiffs—signors of a referendum petition to
reject a bill granting new rights to same-sex partners—were not
similarly situated to the “minor part[ies]” and “fringe organization[s]”
that obtained exemptions in NAACP, Brown, and the related cases
concerning the same or similarly situated parties.114 Next, the court
considered the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence of threats,
harassment, or reprisals, which included isolated accounts of angry
speech, offensive gestures and insults, and threatening phone calls,
among others.115 The court found that plaintiffs’ evidence did not rise
to the “level or amount” presented in Brown and NAACP.116

110. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982); see also, e.g., Elian
Dashev, Note, Economic Boycotts as Harassment: The Threat to First Amendment Protected
Speech in the Aftermath of Doe v. Reed, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 207, 207 (2011) (arguing that
courts should not allow “Major Political Players” to use economic boycotts as a
justification for a disclosure exemption in as-applied challenges); Michael C. Harper,
The Consumer’s Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its
Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 409–10 (1984) (stating that a
consumer right to boycott is appropriate for society and should be regarded as a
“broad political right”).
111. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d. at 924–25, 936.
112. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010).
113. Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1212–13 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
114. Id. at 1203–04.
115. Id. at 1205–10 (summarizing in detail plaintiffs’ evidence of threats,
harassment, and reprisals).
116. Id. at 1210, 1212 (“This is a quite different situation than the progeny of cases
providing an as-applied exemption wherein the government was actually involved in
carrying out the harassment, which was historic, pervasive, and documented.”).
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These cases, among others,117 highlight three defining features of
the disclosure exemption doctrine in the electoral context.
First, as-applied means as-applied. NAACP does not provide justification for
invalidating generally applicable campaign finance transparency regimes
in their entirety, nor does it support new blanket exemptions from
campaign finance disclosure laws.118 A court’s determination of whether an
exemption from campaign finance transparency requirements is warranted
is highly fact dependent.119
Second, the analysis should consider whether the party seeking a disclosure
exemption is a “small, persecuted group whose very existence depend[s] on some
manner of anonymity,” i.e., whether it is similarly situated to the NAACP
in the 1950s or the Socialist Workers and Communist parties in the
1970s and 80s.120
Third, while the allegedly feared threats, harassment, or reprisals need only
be reasonably probable, the nature of probable harm must be serious. The
records in NAACP and Brown, for example, included evidence of
systematic violence and repression faced by the NAACP and Socialist
Workers Party for years.121 Particularly in the electoral context, where
117. E.g., Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 807–08 (9th Cir. 2012) (suggesting
that the exemption will only apply in the “atypical” or “unusual” case); Jones v.
Unknown Agents of the FEC, 613 F.2d 864, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing the
circumstances meriting a grant of an NAACP exemption to be “limited”).
118. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 201–02 (2010) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim for a
blanket exemption from the Washington Public Records Act for signors of referendum
petitions); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
119. See ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827, 840 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“As-applied challenges to contribution disclosure laws are fact-specific in nature.”);
Averill v. City of Seattle, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1174 n.1 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“[T]he
exemption analysis is fact specific and depends on, among other things, the
surrounding political climate and recent indications of hostility . . . .”); see also Doe v.
Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding a “stark contrast” between
plaintiffs’ evidence and the evidence presented in Brown); Master Printers of America
v. Donovan, 751 F.2d 700, 704–05 (4th Cir. 1984) (denying a labor organization an
exemption from the reporting requirements of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA) because the record did not establish the kind of “deterrent
effect” required under Buckley and NAACP).
120. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (E.D. Cal. 2011). See
FEC v. Hall-Tyler Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416, 419–20 (2d Cir. 1982);
Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203–04 (W.D. Wash 2011); see also Dale Ho, supra
note 52, at 435 (“[C]ontext matters: the identity of the party subject to disclosure and
its relative position in society are relevant factors.”).
121. See Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 807–08 (requiring a showing of a “genuine” or “bona
fide” threat of harassment or retaliation); Doe, 697 F.3d at 1248–49 (requiring plaintiff to
show “the kind of focused and insistent harassment . . . required in Buckley”).
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an exemption may result in voters being deprived of information
relevant to their electoral decisions, the scope and severity of likely
threats and harassment must be weighty and go beyond boycotts and
protests that are themselves forms of speech protected by the First
Amendment.122 It is against this legal backdrop that anti-transparency
groups are trying to pry open and magnify this limited exemption.
III. RECENT EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE NARROW NAACP EXEMPTION
INTO A NEW GENERAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Despite courts’ overwhelming recognition of the importance of
ensuring voters have access to information about who is spending money
to influence our elections, efforts to conceal political spending—especially
the spending through corporations that was unleashed by Citizens United—
are on the rise. In particular, powerful, well-funded groups are actively
seeking to change the law through litigation, policy, and media campaigns
that misappropriate the concepts of “threats and harassment” from NAACP
into generalized arguments in favor of secret political spending.
A. Recent Lawsuits Seek Broad Decisions Invalidating Disclosure Laws by
Misconstruing NAACP
In recent years, anti-disclosure groups have filed lawsuits in which they
tried—and, in most cases, failed—to recast NAACP as support for claims that
disclosure requirements are themselves a First Amendment injury. These
lawsuits mischaracterize NAACP as embracing a broad constitutional right to
donor privacy and largely disregard the factual context that was central to the
decision. Fortunately, courts have generally rejected these arguments.
In 2014, the Center for Competitive Politics (CCP)—a § 501(c)(3)
nonprofit organization that has since renamed itself the “Institute for Free
Speech”123—brought a facial challenge to a California rule requiring
California-registered charities to disclose to state regulators the identities of
their major donors as reported on a federal tax form (Form 990 Schedule B)
filed by the charities with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).124 Neither the
federal requirement nor the state rule requires the charitable donor
information to be disclosed to the public.125 CCP invoked NAACP and Buckley
122. See ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d. at 934, 952.
123. IFS Staff, Center for Competitive Politics Renamed Institute for Free Speech, INST. FOR
FREE SPEECH (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.ifs.org/news/center-for-competitive-politicsrenamed-institute-for-free-speech [https://perma.cc/8N7P-4V7P].
124. Ctr. for Competitive Politics v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307, 1309–10 (9th Cir. 2015).
125. See id.
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as purported support for its “novel theory” that the confidential donor
disclosure requirement was “in and of itself” an injury to CCP’s First
Amendment right of association because it would chill its donors’
participation.126 CCP argued that the court should weigh that inherent
injury when analyzing the constitutionality of the reporting requirement.127
The Ninth Circuit rejected CCP’s argument.128 The court acknowledged
that disclosure requirements have an inherent potential to substantially
infringe on the exercise of First Amendment rights in limited
circumstances.129 But that general inherent risk is not sufficient to warrant
an exemption; rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate an “actual burden” on
its right of association, and CCP made no such showing.130 The court also
rejected CCP’s extensive reliance on NAACP and its progeny, explaining
that those “as-applied” cases were irrelevant to CCP’s facial challenge.131
One year later, another group brought a similar constitutional challenge
to California’s Schedule B requirement, although this lawsuit sought an asapplied exemption rather than facial invalidation of the law.132 The plaintiff
seeking as-applied relief was Americans for Prosperity Foundation (AFP
Foundation), a § 501(c)(3) nonprofit connected to billionaire brothers
David and Charles Koch.133 Notably, AFP Foundation is related to
Americans for Prosperity (AFP), a § 501(c)(4) political advocacy
organization whose resources are so substantial, and whose political
spending is so massive and widespread, some have suggested it “may be
America’s third-biggest political party.”134

126. Id. at 1312–13.
127. Id. at 1313–14.
128. See id. at 1316 (“[N]o case has ever held or implied that a disclosure
requirement in and of itself constitutes First Amendment injury.”).
129. Id. at 1313.
130. Id. at 1314, 1316 (explaining that CCP failed to allege that the non-public
disclosures would result in any reprisals by a governmental entity and that its assertions
of inadvertent public disclosure were too speculative).
131. Id. at 1312 n.3.
132. See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2018)
(noting that when the Ninth Circuit ruled against a facial constitutional challenge to
the Schedule B requirement, it “left open the possibility . . . that a future litigant might
. . . warrant relief on an as-applied challenge” (citing Ctr. for Competitive Politics, 784
F.3d at 1317)); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29–32, Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Becerra, 2019 WL 4034756 (Aug. 26, 2019) (No. 19-255).
133. Ams. for Prosperity Found., 903 F.3d at 1004, 1013.
134. See Philip Bump, Americans for Prosperity May Be America’s Third Biggest Political
Party, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014, 2:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2014/06/19/americans-for-prosperity-is-americas-third-biggest-political-

2020]

SECRET MONEY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

1419

In its challenge to California’s Schedule B requirement, AFP
Foundation argued that the confidential disclosure rule would deter
contributors by subjecting them to threats, harassment, and reprisals in
the event that state regulators inadvertently leaked Schedule B to the
public.135 AFP presented evidence that some of its public supporters,
including the Koch brothers, had endured boycotts, defamatory articles,
personal threats, and other economic reprisals.136 Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the risk of inadvertent public disclosure was so
slight that there was no reasonable probability that California’s
confidential disclosure requirement would lead to any such reprisals.137
The Second Circuit considered substantially identical claims
challenging New York’s Schedule B disclosure requirements, and it
reached the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit.138 The plaintiff,
Citizens United, argued that New York’s confidential disclosure law, by
itself, substantially infringed its First Amendment associational
rights.139 The Second Circuit disagreed, recognizing that although any
disclosure rule “comes with some risk of abuse,” that “background risk”
is not itself a constitutional problem, nor is disclosure “itself an evil.”140
party (discussing AFP’s $100 million spending on 2014 election races); see also Nicholas
Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par with Both Parties’
Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01
/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html (reporting
that AFP’s planned spending of almost $900 million on the 2016 campaign was an
“unparalleled effort by coordinated outside groups to shape a presidential election”);
Jonathan Easley, Koch Network Launching 4 PACs, Open to Backing Some Dems in 2020,
HILL (June 7, 2019, 9:11 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/447420koch-network-launching-4-new-pacs-in-preparation-for-2020-primary
[https://perma.cc/QH38-G754] (explaining that AFP, a “sprawling network of
libertarian-minded donors, philanthropists and activists[,] spent $400 million on
politics and policy during the 2018 election cycle”); Alexander Hertel-Fernandez et
al., How the Koch Brothers Built the Most Powerful Rightwing Group You’ve Never Heard of,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2018, 3:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/sep/26/koch-brothers-americans-for-prosperity-rightwing-political-group
[https://perma.cc/VH6K-4U6B] (highlighting AFP-Wisconsin’s 125,000 grassroots
activists, which equal “around 2% of the state’s population”); Kenneth P. Vogel, How
the Koch Network Rivals the GOP, POLITICO: THE KOCH MACHINE (Dec. 30, 2015, 5:17 AM),
http://bit.ly/31HlPbV [https://perma.cc/27SW-W9RW] (describing AFP’s internal
workings, massive expenditures, and political clout).
135. Ams. for Prosperity Found., 903 F.3d at 1013.
136. Id. at 1016–17.
137. Id. at 1017–19.
138. See Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2018).
139. Id. at 383.
140. Id.
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The court explained that “anonymity can protect both those whose
unpopular beliefs might subject them to retaliation and those who seek
to avoid detection (and consequences) for deceptive or harmful
activities that governments have legitimate interests in preventing.”141
The Second Circuit rejected Citizens United’s attempt to use NAACP
as a broad sword to strike down transparency laws on their face. Citing
Buckley and Citizens United, the court noted that NAACP only offers a “shield
of privacy” when disclosure results in actual restraints on associational
rights—as measured by a reasonable probability that disclosure will result
in serious threats, harassment, or reprisals—and when those actual
restraints outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure.142
Applying that standard, the Second Circuit also rejected Citizens
United’s as-applied challenge, noting that the group’s evidence—
“bare assertion[s]” of retaliatory targeting by the New York Attorney
General—was a “far cry from the clear and present danger that white
supremacist vigilantes and their abettors in the Alabama state
government presented to members of the NAACP in the 1950s.”143
Of course, the confidential disclosure requirements challenged in
these cases are not entirely parallel to the election transparency
requirements addressed in Buckley, Brown, Citizens United, and the cases
addressing same-sex marriage ballot measures. The likelihood of
threats and retaliation is arguably lower in the context of Schedule B
rules, which require charitable organizations to disclose their major
donors to government regulators, but not to the public. Those rules also
promote some government interests that are not implicated by
election-spending transparency laws, like enabling the government to
ensure that charities and other nonprofit groups are complying with
the requirements that entitle them to their tax exemptions. At the
same time, Schedule B reporting requirements and campaign finance
disclosure requirements both help government officials identify fraud
and other violations of law, including campaign finance law,144 while
campaign finance disclosure requirements also reduce corruption and
inform voters about the sources of election spending.
Regardless of these distinctions, these and other broad legal
challenges to confidential Schedule B reporting, if successful, threaten
to undermine campaign finance transparency requirements. Indeed,
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 385.
See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
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one district court has already suggested, in dicta, that our current
divisive political climate, “marked by the so-called cancel or call-out
culture,” may make it easier for AFP to obtain a disclosure exemption
today than in the past.145 The mere suggestion that such an enormously
powerful organization146 could be eligible for an NAACP exemption
marks a concerning departure from established precedents.
B. Legislative and Regulatory Efforts to Eliminate Disclosure Requirements
Efforts to eliminate or reduce the scope of political transparency laws
are not limited to litigation. Legislatures and agencies are also pursuing
policy changes that would override existing disclosure requirements,
reducing transparency about groups engaged in political spending and
undermining regulators’ ability to detect and respond to violations of law.
In the past few years, for example, virtually identical antitransparency bills were introduced in Michigan and Mississippi.147 The
bills included language broadly restricting the ability of state and local
agencies to require § 501(c) nonprofit organizations to disclose
information about their members, donors, and supporters—including
even when the disclosure filings would not be made available to the
public.148 Importantly, the mandatory concealment of nonprofits’
information was not limited to charities and religious organizations
established under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, but
extended to § 501(c)(4) “social welfare” organizations, § 501(c)(5)
labor unions, and § 501(c)(6) trade associations, all of which engage

145. Ams. for Prosperity v. Grewal, No. 3:19-cv-14228-BRM-LHG, 2019 WL 4855853,
at *20 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2019). The court ultimately held that New Jersey’s broad
transparency law, which imposed public donor disclosure requirements on groups that
spend money to influence elections or to simply provide factual information on
candidates and ballot issues, was likely unconstitutional on its face and thus avoided
the question of whether AFP was entitled to an as-applied exemption. Id.
146. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
147. An Act to Provide that a Public Agency Shall Not Require Any Entity Organized
Under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code to Provide the Public Agency with
Personal Information, H.B. No. 1205 (Miss. 2019), http://billstatus.ls.s
tate.ms.us/documents/2019/pdf/HB/1200-1299/HB1205SG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YG5-JU3V]; Personal Privacy Protection Act, S. 1176, 99th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2017-2018/
billenrolled/Senate/pdf/2018-SNB-1176.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RJE-386P].
148. Miss. H.B. No. 1205; Mich. S. 1176, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess.

1422

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1395

in extensive amounts of political campaigning and lobbying activity.149
As one columnist in Mississippi observed, shielding these activities
from disclosure helps “those who want to buy candidates and influence
elections who do not want their identities known.”150
In December 2018, former Michigan Governor Rick Snyder vetoed
the Michigan bill.151 He characterized it as “a solution in search of a
problem” and pointed out that the Supreme Court’s longstanding
NAACP decision already provides as-applied protection to a group facing
a genuine prospect of harm as a result of disclosure.152 A few months later,
on April 3, 2019, former Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant signed a nearly
identical bill into law.153
The IRS is also considering policy changes that would dramatically
narrow the scope of tax-exempt organizations that are subject to IRS
reporting requirements. Under the long-standing existing rule, each
nonprofit group organized under § 501(c) of the tax code must
confidentially report to the IRS the identity of all contributors who donate
$5,000 or more per year to the organization.154 The current rule—which
created the federal Schedule B that California and New York require state
charities to file with regulators in those states—serves the same interests
of enabling the government to identify and address fraud and violations
149. See Dark Money Basics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/
dark-money/basics [https://perma.cc/A8KT-7A4N] (detailing the operation of political
nonprofits and super PACs and their covert financial influences on elections).
150. See Bill Crawford, Bryant Should Veto Dark Money Bill, MERIDIAN STAR (Mar. 24,
2019), https://www.meridianstar.com/opinion/columns/bill-crawford-bryant-should
-veto-dark-money-bill/article_47a1434e-a39b-50f9-a0bc-46059c3240bd.html
[https://perma.cc/QKP6-AANU].
151. Veto Statement for S. 1176, Gov. Rick Snyder (Dec. 28, 2018), S. Journal, 99th
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2637 (Mich. 2018),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(yvybvzsl35tcqf0nvozbp4h2))/documents/20172018/Journal/Senate/pdf/2018-SJ-12-31-085.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4RZ-F46Y]; see
Jim Malewitz, Snyder Vetoes Bills Criticized as ‘Power Grabs,’ REC. EAGLE (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://www.record-eagle.com/opinion/opinion-snyder-vetoes-bills-criticizedaspower-grabs/article_f6335061-4889-5c5f-ae09-fd8edae6ceb6.html
[https://perma.cc/QH8P-YB38] (noting that in 2019, Michigan saw an
“unprecedented influx of cash from so-called dark money groups,” many of which were
located out of state, in its elections).
152. Veto Statement for S. 1176, supra note 151.
153. See Miss. Code. Ann. § 25-62-3 (2019) (prohibiting public agencies from
requiring disclosures from any 501(c) organization).
154. Returns and Annual Reports of Exempt Organizations, 36 Fed. Reg. 11,025,
11,027 (June 8, 1971) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); see also 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6001-1(c),
1.6033-2(a)(2)(iii)(a) (2019).

2020]

SECRET MONEY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

1423

other laws that the Ninth and Second Circuits cited in upholding the
California and New York requirements.155
A recently proposed rule would eliminate the federal Schedule B
reporting requirement for all tax-exempt organizations except
charities incorporated under § 501(c)(3) and § 527 political
organizations.156 As explained in comments submitted by the
nonpartisan Campaign Legal Center, a group of sixteen United States
Senators, and others,157 the proposed rule would thus enable groups
like § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations and § 501(c)(6) trade
associations—organizations that serve as vehicles for hundreds of
millions of dollars of political spending158—to conceal the sources of
155. See supra Section III.A; see also Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374,
382 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Collecting donor information on a regular basis from all
organizations ‘facilitates investigative efficiency,’ and can help [regulators] to ‘obtain
a complete picture of [the organizations’] operations’ and ‘flag suspicious activity’
simply by using information already available to the IRS.”).
156. Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of
Exempt Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47,447, 47,451 (proposed Sept. 9, 2019) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
157. See Campaign Legal Center, Comment Letter on Guidance Under Section
6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2019-0039-3096
[https://perma.cc/VL6T-AFLU] (explaining how the proposed repeal of the
requirement that certain tax-exempt organizations identify significant donors will
“effectively invite illegal foreign spending in U.S. elections, cripple future enforcement
of campaign finance laws, and hamstring efficient tax administration”); U.S. Sen. Amy
Klobuchar et al., Comment Letter on Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the
Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2019-0039-8319 [https://perma.cc/XG4T-3ML5]
(expressing “significant concern” that the proposed repeal of IRS nonprofit reporting
requirement will “undermine[] our political system” and “make[] it easier for foreign
adversaries to influence our elections”). One comment regarding the proposed rule,
submitted by U.S. Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Tom Udall, Richard Blumenthal,
and Elizabeth Warren, describes the magnitude of this “explosion” of political
spending by § 501(c)(4) organizations since the Supreme Court issued its Citizens
United decision. U.S. Sen. Whitehouse et al., Comment Letter on Guidance Under
Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations (Dec.
9, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2019-0039-8363 [https://
perma.cc/EJ2G-PTKL]. They explain that “[s]ince 2010, 501(c)(4) organizations have
spent over $800 million on political expenditures, compared to $103 million in the
previous decade.” Id. The Senators note that in 2016, 95 § 501(c) organizations spent
$50,000 or more on independent election expenditures, totaling $185 million, and
the ten largest of those ninety-five spenders were responsible for 77% of the total, while
the top three were responsible for nearly half. Id.
158. See Dark Money Basics, supra note 149; see also infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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that spending not only from the public but also from government
regulators. The loss of this important oversight mechanism would make it
much harder to detect abuses of the organizations’ tax exemptions, or to
determine whether foreign entities are using such organizations to conceal
unlawful attempts to interfere in American elections.159
Anti-transparency groups, including organizations who unsuccessfully
challenged the California and New York Schedule B requirements, are
urging the IRS to adopt the proposed rule, arguing that existing disclosure
requirements violate the First Amendment.160 One has renewed the “novel
theory” that donor disclosure requirements are “in and of [themselves]”
First Amendment injuries, relying on the same flawed interpretations of
NAACP and Buckley that the Ninth Circuit rejected.161 Another has invoked
general concerns about threats, harassment, and reprisals, including

159. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (Supp. 2017) (prohibiting foreign nations from
contributing to federal, state, and local elections); see also Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp.
2d 281, 284 (D.D.C. 2011) (construing the foreign national ban expansively, including
to prohibit foreign nationals “from making donations to outside groups when those
donations in turn would be used to make contributions to candidates or parties or to
finance express-advocacy expenditures”), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012); Brendan Fischer,
Campaign Finance Law in the 21st Century, in EXAMINING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS: A REPORT FROM THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER 12 (2018), https://
campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-Report-interactive-pages.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WFX-PN6C] (noting that foreign actors will continue to attempt
to influence U.S. elections and that “loopholes exploited by foreign actors in the 2016
elections are certain to be used again”).
160. Institute for Free Speech, Comment Letter on Guidance Under Section 6033
Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=IRS-2019-0039-1645&
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/5MP8-HW88] (asserting
that compelled disclosure of financial contributors to civil society organizations is in
itself a First Amendment injury); Americans for Prosperity, Comment Letter on
Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt
Organizations (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?
documentId=IRS-2019-0039-1502&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
[https://perma.cc/TPY2-XQHP] (suggesting that donor disclosure has an
unconstitutional “chilling” effect on free speech and association).
161. Compare Institute for Free Speech, supra note 160, with Ctr. for Competitive
Politics v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting CCP’s argument that
disclosure requirement, “in and of itself,” harms First Amendment rights, and
explaining that CCP’s theory “is not supported by [Ninth Circuit] case law or by
Supreme Court precedent”).
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“boycotts” and “public shaming,” while arguing that disclosure may
discourage donations and “drain[] resources.”162
Efforts to change the law—like the reforms proposed in Michigan and
adopted Mississippi and the proposed new IRS rule—underscore the multifront assault being waged against disclosure rules by organizations and their
funders who would prefer to keep their political spending secret. These
attacks on disclosure receive broad support from anti-transparency groups,
including the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a corporatefunded organization163 that pairs state legislators with corporate lobbyists to
craft “model bills” for introduction in the states.164 Legal reform efforts are
also aided by a parallel public messaging project that seeks to reduce public
support for political transparency rules165 by frightening people with
dramatized stories about alleged disclosure-induced threats and harassment.
162. Americans for Prosperity, supra note 160. But lack of resources is plainly not a
problem for AFP: its funding is so substantial, it spent hundreds of millions of dollars on
politics and policy during the 2018 election cycle alone. See supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
163. See Form 990 from Am. Legislative Exch. Council 1, 9 (July 15, 2010),
https://pdf.guidestar.org/PDF_Images/2009/520/140/2009-520140979-064206f49.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR5M-DBU7] (reporting over $5 million of ALEC’s revenue
as coming from “other contributions, gifts, [and] grants”); see also Lisa Graves, A CMD
Special Report on ALEC’s Funding and Spending, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY’S
PRWATCH (July 13, 2011, 7:54 AM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/07/10887
/cmd-special-report-alecs-funding-and-spending [https://perma.cc/PQ5M-WG3D]
(“Almost 98% of ALEC’s funding comes from corporations like Exxon Mobil,
corporate ‘foundations’ like the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation, or trade
associations like the pharmaceutical industry’s PhRMA and sources other than ‘legislative
dues.’ Those funds help subsidize legislators’ trips to ALEC meetings, where they are wined,
dined, and handed ‘model’ legislation to make law in their state.”); Peter Overby, Companies
Flee Group Behind ‘Stand Your Ground,’ NPR (Apr. 13, 2012, 3:03 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2012/04/13/150528572/as-pressure-mounts-companies-fleecoalition [https://perma.cc/N6Y5-4V94] (describing ALEC’s practice of developing bills
“by having state legislators team up with corporate lobbyists” to craft legislation which
“lawmakers take . . . home to introduce at their state capitols,” and noting that “corporate
and foundation money” covers nearly all of the organization’s budget).
164. See, e.g., Molly Jackman, ALEC’s Influence over Lawmaking in State Legislatures,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/alecsinfluence-over-lawmaking-in-state-legislatures [https://perma.cc/6FM9-N9VP]; John
Nichols, ALEC Exposed, NATION (July 12, 2011), https://www.thenation.com/ article/alecexposed; Nancy Scola, Exposing ALEC: How Conservative-Backed State Laws are All Connected,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/
exposing-alec-how-conservative-backed-state-laws-are-all-connected/255869.
165. See Sheely Edwards, Bipartisan Poll Finds Voters Want Stronger Enforcement of
Campaign Finance Laws, Increased Transparency in Elections, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Nov.
18, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/index.php/update/bipartisan-poll-finds-voters-
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C. Attacks on Political-Spending Transparency Through Misleading Public
Messaging and Fear-Mongering
A coordinated messaging campaign is disseminating ominous stories
about the supposed consequences of political donor disclosure laws.
Although documented cases of harassment stemming from the disclosure
of a political contribution record are exceedingly rare, these messages
combine misleading stories with fear-based anti-transparency appeals.
For example, a group called People United for Privacy disseminates
professionally produced videos warning of the supposed “dangers” of
transparency.166 People United for Privacy’s videos often combine
want-stronger-enforcement-campaign-finance-laws-increased [https://perma.cc/BU
6N-696N] (finding that “[a] majority of voters rate ‘corruption in the political system’
as the most serious problem facing the country”).
166. See, e.g., People United for Privacy, Supporting Causes Without Fear of Harassment
and Intimidation, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (May 17, 2019), https://www.facebook.com
/ads/library/?id=343848039605693 [https://perma.cc/FH79-KQKK]; People United
for Privacy, Transparency Is for Government, Privacy Is for People, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Mar.
21, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=328470818014968 [https://
perma.cc/P42M-MPMQ]. People United for Privacy is a product of closely linked and
well-funded organizations that have been fighting against reasonable disclosure
measures across the country for years. See, e.g., AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, DONOR
DISCLOSURE LEGISLATIVE TOOLKIT 3 (2017), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/
2017/09/ALEC-Donor-Disclosure-Legislative-Toolkit-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTY35Q8L] (laying out steps for donors to combat donor disclosure legislation); SEAN
PARNELL, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE, PROTECTING DONOR PRIVACY: PHILANTHROPIC
FREEDOM, ANONYMITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (2017), https://www.philanthropy
roundtable.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/protecting-philanth
ropic-privacy_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5YM-376K] (describing People
United for Privacy as an “initiative” of State Policy Network); Robert Faturechi, The
Conservative Playbook for Keeping ‘Dark Money’ Dark, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 4, 2016, 12:45 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-conservative-playbook-for-keeping-dark-moneydark [https://perma.cc/74FP-MGEC]. Organizations like the Competitive Enterprise
Institute and the Institute for Free Speech, in turn, share and deploy People United for
Privacy content in their own materials. See, e.g., Institute for Free Speech (@InstFreeSpeech),
TWITTER (Dec. 18, 2017, 2:17 PM), https://twitter.com/InstFreeSpeech/status/
942836251736100865 [https://perma.cc/69K9-WHF6]; Richard Morrison, Unite for Privacy
and the First Amendment, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Feb. 17, 2017), https://cei.org
/blog/unite-privacy-and-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/UJK6-EC57]. Leaders of
organizations like the Goldwater Institute, ALEC, and FreedomWorks have provided
testimonials for People United for Privacy’s videos. See, e.g., People United for Privacy,
Testimonial of ALEC CEO Lisa B. Nelson, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=2233850430188226 [https://perma.cc/
P9S3-G8FB]; People United for Privacy, Testimonial of FreedomWorks President
Adam Brandon, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/
ads/library/?id=852549738421369 [https://perma.cc/T97V-HWH5].
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examples of political donors claiming to have experienced harassment
as a result of their donations with frightening hypothetical
consequences of donor disclosure.167 But the most frequent examples of
“harassment” that People United for Privacy and its allies deploy do not
actually relate to political donor disclosure.
For example, one video claims that “[i]n Wisconsin, Cindy A. had
her home raided for support of union reforms,” and that “Erious J. was
profiled in Oregon after using a #BlackLivesMatter hashtag.”168 The
Cindy A. example receives additional emphasis in the longer True Story:
Wisconsin John Doe Victims video featured on its YouTube page,169 which
features hauntingly lit footage depicting a pre-dawn raid and Cindy
A.’s retelling of her home being searched one morning. But that raid
had nothing to do with disclosure of her political donations. Instead,
her home was searched in connection with a probe into bid-rigging
during Scott Walker’s pregubernatorial tenure as county executive,
when Cindy A. served as one of his top aides.170
Likewise, the “Erious J.” story has nothing to do with disclosing
Erious J.’s political donations. As Oregon Public Radio describes,
Erious J. was “caught up in digital surveillance by the [Oregon
Department of Justice] because he used the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag

167. See, e.g., People United for Privacy YouTube Channel, YOUTUBE, https://www.
youtube.com/channel/UCmaYrE5NxTrGZuB6sXUDwlQ [https://perma.cc/X42LBEHF] (last updated Dec. 20, 2019); Spread the Word, PEOPLE UNITED FOR PRIVACY,
http://unitedforprivacy.com/Videos/page/2 [https://perma.cc/MM8L-TXX7].
168. People United for Privacy, Blacklisted, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=422863661606480 [https://perma.cc/
G86D-33LQ]. This ad generated between 50,000 and 100,000 Facebook user impressions
over three days. Id. People United for Privacy has also featured this video on Twitter.
People United for Privacy (@UniteForPrivacy), TWITTER (Apr. 25, 2019, 10:06 PM),
https://twitter.com/UniteForPrivacy/status/1121596477824995328/video/1 [https://
perma.cc/M4F4-G3LR].
169. People United for Privacy, True Story: Wisconsin John Doe Victims, YOUTUBE (Nov.
27, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9Owg0wuVyA [https://perma.cc/
3MGK-XDDB].
170. See, e.g., Jason Stein, Patrick Marley, Steve Schultze & Daniel Bice, FBI Seizes
Items at Home of Former Top Aide to Gov. Walker, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Sept. 14,
2011), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/129801878.html [https://
perma.cc/3ZTZ-QBMG]; Dave Umhoefer & Steve Schultze, John Doe Investigation Looks into
Bids to House County Workers, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/corruption-investigation-looks-into-bidsto-house-county-workers-0s3t07c-138020933.html [https://perma.cc/7X9E-3JCG].
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and tweeted the well-known logo of the rap group Public Enemy,” and
he later sued the state for racial profiling.171
In another misleading video, “Darcy O,”172 described being criticized
and threatened during a high-profile case that involved the Goldwater
Institute. “I walked away from this experience with a greater appreciation
of the importance of being anonymous—of having your information be
private,” she concluded in the video.173 While “Darcy O.” may have been
targeted based on her association with the Goldwater Institute, that
association was not publicized because of her political donations. She was
CEO of the organization. The people responsible for the activity described
in the video identified her address through public property records.174
Anti-transparency stories like these also frequently exaggerate the
consequences of a donor’s disclosure. In one commonly invoked example,
we learn that Margie Christofferson “lost her job” after being disclosed as a
donor to the pro-Proposition 8 ballot measure committee, which supported
amending the California constitution to define marriage as only between a
man and a woman.175 Stories about Christofferson cite the loss of her job,
boycotts of her restaurant, and public criticism she experienced. But even
setting aside that boycotts and criticism are protected by the First
Amendment,176 these stories omit that Christofferson, who was the

171. Andrew Dorn, Johnson Says Oregon DOJ Didn’t Show ‘Loyalty’ in Civil Rights Case, OPB
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.opb.org/radio/programs/thinkoutloud/segment/oregoncivil-rights-attorney-settlement-erious-johnson-interview [https:// perma.cc/28UB-7ZDU].
172. People United for Privacy, Darcy’s True Story: Death Threats, Violence, and
Intimidation, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cGRlgsqChQ&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/9LC3-ZXKT].
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., John Marshall, Goldwater Institute Files Lawsuit in Coyotes Deal,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 13, 2012), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/sports/
goldwater-institute-files-lawsuit-in-coyotes-deal/article_b43e25b6-b584-11e1-99c2001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/E4K2-GM2D]; Tracie Sharp & Darcy Olsen,
Beware of Anti-Speech Ballot Measures, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/beware-of-anti-speech-ballot-measures-1474586180?mod=searchresults&page
=1&pos=2 (stating explicitly that the “hockey fans used property tax records to find
the home address of the institute’s president, Ms. Olsen, and post it online”).
175. True Stories of Harassment and Intimidation, PEOPLE UNITED FOR PRIVACY,
http://unitedforprivacy.com/true-stories-of-harassment-and-intimidation
[https://perma.cc/H3MZ-YTU2].
176. See, e.g., supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. As one article explained,
many of the restaurant’s employees and customers were gay, and the boycott expressed
opposition to Christofferson’s support for a ballot measure that would “strip their
rights.” Lisa Derrick, El Coyote Boycott? Mormon Manager’s Faith Overrides “Love” for
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restaurant owner’s daughter, returned to her job after voluntarily resigning
for a brief period—she was not fired as the references to “losing” her job
imply.177 Now, she owns the restaurant.178
Millions of political contribution records have been made public since
the 1970s, yet as these examples illustrate, even groups that are highly
motivated to highlight instances of harassment resulting from
individuals’ political contributions seem to have a difficult time finding
legitimate examples.
CONCLUSION
More than half a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence
conclusively establishes that the government may constitutionally
require transparency about spending to influence the American
political process. More precisely, ensuring transparency about electionrelated spending—including who is bankrolling the groups that spend money
on elections—promotes First Amendment interests by allowing voters to
make informed decisions at the ballot box.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that in certain narrow
circumstances, groups that lack political or economic power may face such
substantial threats or harassment as a result of complying with disclosure
requirements that a disclosure exemption is necessary to protect the
groups’ ability to exercise their First Amendment right to associate. But
such circumstances are limited and do not include donors’ mere
preference to remain anonymous. Nor are generalized fears of
boycotts, protests, and other First-Amendment-protected counter
speech an adequate basis to keep the sources of political spending
secret. Powerful, well-funded organizations like AFP are not similarly
situated to groups like the NAACP in the civil rights era or the Socialist
Workers Party in the early 1980s. AFP and other large, highly

Customers, HUFFPOST (Dec. 14, 2008, updated Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com
/entry/el-coyote-boycott-mormon_b_143605 [https://perma.cc/2HWE-YET6].
177. Lisa Derrick, Margaritas Flow Again: El Coyote Manager Resigns Over Prop 8,
HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017) (“Christoffersen tended her resignation to her mother,
Grace Salisbury, described on El Coyote Web site as the ‘matriarch’ of the restaurant.”)
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/margaritas-flow-again-el_b_149457
[https://perma.cc/VE5B-LB2L].
178. Jada Montemarano, El Coyote Ramping Up for Annual Cinco de Mayo Festivities, SPECTRUM
NEWS (May 3, 2019), https://spectrumnews1.com/ca/la-west/news/2019/05/03/el-coyoteprepares-for-massive-cinco-de-mayo-party [https://perma.cc/K2V9-8A52].
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influential organizations do not need “the special protection of
anonymity in order for [their] voice[s] or views to be heard.”179
Finally, unique features of our current environment make effective
political transparency requirements more critical today than ever
before. Since the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United, it
has become increasingly easy for corporations, special interests,
wealthy individuals, and even foreign nationals to direct unlimited
amounts of secret “dark” money into our elections.180 The dramatic shift
of political advertising away from broadcast media to the internet has
also created new opportunities to conceal the sources of election
spending, because many federal and state transparency laws have a
digital blind spot that leaves most digital political ads unregulated.181
These developments mean it is already too easy to evade transparency
laws. Yet efforts to strengthen campaign finance transparency
requirements through legislation and regulation remain in limbo,182

179. Dale Ho, supra note 52, at 435 (making this point about “the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, with its three hundred thousand members representing three million
businesses and $140 million in annual contributions”).
180. For more detailed analyses of the origins and effects of dark money spending
on American elections, see, e.g., Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of
Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383 (2013); Daniel C. Kirby, Note, The Legal
Quagmire of IRC § 501(c)(4) Organizations and the Consequential Rise of Dark Money in
Elections, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 223 (2015); Dark Money Basics, supra note 149; Richard
L. Hasen, The Decade of Citizens United: It’s Hard to Overstate the Impact of This One
Devastating Case on the Past 10 Years of American Politics, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/12/citizens-united-devastating-impactamerican-politics.html [https://perma.cc/QW5T-HYPJ].
181. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, DIGITAL AD DISCLOSURE: STOP SECRET
SPENDING IN THE DIGITAL WORLD, https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/201912/Toolkit%20-Digital%20Ad%20One%20Pager%20-%2011.21.pdf [https://perma
.cc/KLR2-CA4C]; Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public
Communication,” 83 Fed. Reg. 12864, 12865–68 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (describing
existing rules for disclaimers on political ads and the FEC’s past application of
disclaimer exemptions to certain internet ads); see also, e.g., Sara Swann, The Struggle Is
Real: FEC Stalled on Regulations for Online Political Ads, FULCRUM (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://thefulcrum.us/open-government/fec-no-internet-ad-regulation
[https://perma.cc/DGM3-EQDW].
182. See For the People Act of 2019, H.R. Rep. No. 116-15, pt. 1 (2019); Ella Nilsen,
House Democrats Just Passed a Slate of Significant Reforms to Get Money out of Politics, VOX (Mar.
8, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/8/18253609/hr-1-pelosi-house-democrats-anticorruption-mcconnell [https://perma.cc/KH3K-9TWC] (reporting that H.R. 1, which
includes provisions “aimed at getting money out of politics and increasing

2020]

SECRET MONEY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

1431

while the multi-front assault on existing transparency regimes is
escalating. It is thus more important now than ever to protect voters’ First
Amendment rights by ensuring that the NAACP exemption remains the
narrow exemption it was intended to be, rather than a new mechanism
for wealthy special interests to influence the political process in secret.

transparency around donors” is “already dead on arrival in the Senate”); Swann, supra
note 181 (discussing stalled FEC rulemaking for digital political ad disclaimers).

